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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATE OF 
GEORGE R. POWELL, 
Deceased. 
STATE OF UTAH 
CENTRAL BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY, (Administrator) 
and THE HEIRS OF FLORENCE 
EUNICE POWELL, 
Respondents, 
vs. 
LAMAR P. WEST, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 16,877 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
CENTRAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for declaratory relief in a contested 
probate where the administrator of the estate is seeking to 
clarify its duties in distributing the assets of the decedent. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court, after a trial on the merits of apel-
lant's objections to the respondent's petition, held that 
the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment 
in Civil Number 7416 in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
for Uintah County, were res judicata as to any claims for 
relief requested by the appellant. There being no other 
objectors, the court granted the relief requested by the 
respondent, Central Bank and Trust Company. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, Central Bank and Trust Company, seeks to 
have this court affirm the lower court's judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although some of the facts cited in the appellant's 
brief are true, there are no citations to the record sup-
porting said facts as required by Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent will, therefore, set 
forth the material facts of the case. 
On July 2, 1974, the appellant filed a petition for ad-
mission of will to probate seeking to have herself appointed 
as personal representative of the decedent's estate. {R.2) 
She contended that the will was valid (R.21), but other 
heirs challenged venue (R.16-31, R.40-58). After the court 
determined that the probate was properly commenced in Utah 
County (R.65), the appellant testified a second time in 
support of its admission to probate (R.77). The will was 
then admitted to probate, and the appellant was appointed 
the executrix (R.83). 
On October 6, 1975, the appellant resigned as the 
executrix (R.106) and she and the other heirs nominated the 
respondent, Central Bank and Trust Company as the adminis-
trator of the decedent's estate (R.95-109). The respondent 
was appointed by the court on February 18, 1976 (R.111). 
Florence A. Powell of Vernal Utah, and Florence Eunice 
Powell of Laural, Montana, asserted claims against the 
-2-
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estate, asserting that they were both the same named bene-
ficiary under the decedent's will. Since it appeared that 
there were conflicting claims against the estate, the respon-
dent simultaneously filed a petition to determine heirship 
in this probate (R.113), and a separate complaint and inter-
pleader as Civil Number 44,913 in Utah County (R.290). The 
petition to determine heirship was held to be moot since the 
complaint and interpleader were filed (R.129), and the complaint 
and interpleader were later consolidated with this probate 
matter (R.454). At the time of the filing of the petition 
to determine heirship, the appellant filed an affidavit 
alleging that the co-respondent, Florence Eunice Powell of 
Laurel, Montana, was the proper "Florence Powell" to receive 
the bequest under the decedent's will. 
Another action had been instituted in Uintah County as 
Civil Number 7416, among all of the heirs of the decedent and 
beneficiaries under his will, except Florence Eunice Powell 
of Laurel, Montana. On the basis of a stipulation made between 
the parties in that action (R.228-238), the court entered 
an order in this probate matter declaring the will null and 
void, directing the respondent to proceed with the probate 
of the estate as if the decedent had died intestate (R.142), 
and to otherwise comply with the stipulat~on of the parties 
as set forth in the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment (R.150-159). 
Since Florence Eunice Powell was not before the court, 
the settlement stipulation as to "Florence Powell", was con-
-3-
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ditioned upon Florence A. Powell prevailing as the named 
person in the will of the decedent (R.158, paragraph (h). 
The complaint and interpleader was then tried by the 
lower court. The court ruled that Florence Eunice Powell of 
Laurel Montana (now her assignees, she having died) was 
the named "Florence Powell", and was entitled to the distri-
bution intended for said person under the decedent's will 
(R.181). 
The respondent then filed the petition for declaratory 
relief since there were conflicting orders and it wanted to 
know how distribution was to be made among the competing 
claimants (R.182-210). The appellant filed an objection to 
the respondent's motion claiming she did not understand the 
stipulation when made two years previously, and further 
seeking to raise other issues regarding distribution of the 
estate settled two years previously (R.216). 
After a trial on the merits of appellant's objections 
to the respondent's petition, the court granted the relief 
requested by the respondent, Central Bank and Trust Company. 
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE RESPONDENT-ADMINISTRATOR IS A STAKEHOLDER FACED 
WITH CONFLICTING COURT ORDERS. 
The respondent, as the administrator of the estate of 
George R. Powell, deceased, has the statutory duty to settle 
and distribute the estate of the decedent. This must be 
done in accordance with the terms of any probated will or 
court order §75-3-703 U.C.A., {see also predecessor sta-
-4-
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tutes, §75-11-2 and §75-11-3 U.C.A.). It has responsibility 
similar to that of a trustee, holding legal title to the de-
cedent's property for the benefit of the heirs of the decedent 
or the beneficiaries of his will. §75-3-703 u. C.A. c. f. 
Wilson v. Martinez, 76 Wyo 196, 301 P.2d 785 (1956). As 
such, it has, in this matter, no claim to the assets of the 
estate and is a mere stakeholder, but must ascertain who of 
the competing claimants are to receive them. 
The probate of the decedent's will was commenced by the 
appellant prior to the adoption of the Utah Uniform Probate 
Code. She was appointed as the executrix of the decedent's 
Will by court order dated October 21, 197~/(R.83). The Utah 
statute in force at that time governing contests of probated 
wills provided in part as follows: 
"Any person who has not contested a will ••• 
may contest the same or the probate thereof at any 
time within six months after the admission to pro-
bate, and not afterward; ••• " §75-3-12 U.C.A. 
The Utah Supreme Court had an occasion to review that 
statute in the two appeals of In Re Howard's Estate. 2 Ut. 
2d 112, 269 P.2d 1049 (1954), and 3 Ut.2d 76, 278 P.2d 622 
(1955). In the first case, this court held on interlocatory 
appeal, that the probate of the wills became final at the ex-
piration of the six months period. No contest could there-
after be brought as to their validity because the court lost 
jurisdiction to entertain any such contest. 
In the second Howard's Estate case, the inconsistent 
instruments had been entered for probate and construed by 
-5-
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the lower court. The Supreme Court was then faced with the 
problem of constructing those inconsistent instruments. Up-
holding its prior decision this court held: 
" ••• since under the facts of this case it 
can reasonably be found that the later instruments 
did not dispose of the entire estate and are not 
wholly inconsistent with each other the court did not 
err in admitting all the instruments as the last will 
and testament of the testatrix and in construing all 
to be effective insofar as their dispositions are 
consistent with each other, and where they are incon-
sistent that the later dispositions revoke the earlier. 
2 Ut.2d at 82, 228 P.2d at 24. 
Since the time for contest of the will filed by the 
appellant had clearly passed before the respondent was 
appointed the administrator of the estate, it had no choice 
but to administer the estate of the decedent in accordance 
with said will. In fact, the 12 months period for contest 
under the Utah Uniform Probate Code, §75-3-412 (3){c) U.C.A., 
had likewise expired before the appointment of respondent. 
When the parties entered into the stipulation in Civil 
Number 7416 in Uintah County, the appellant was a party 
before the court, but Florence Eunice Powell of Laurel, 
Montana was not. The parties before the court in effect 
agreed to let the estate pass by the laws of intestacy, 
reserving the question of the amount passing to "Florence 
Powell". Since they could not bind her, the parties expressly 
stipulated for the contingency of Florence Eunice Powell's 
claim against the estate. Subparagraph lO(h) of the Findings 
of Facts and Conclusions of law provided: 
-6-
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The settlement is conditioned upon the inter-
vener or other litigant obtaining from the court a 
determination by litigation or otherwise that Florence 
Eunice Powell of Montana was and is not, the Florence 
Powell named as executor and heir in the will of June 
4, 1974. This matter is at issue before this court in 
Uintah County. In the event that Florence Powell of 
Montana shall establish that she is in fact an heir, 
this stipulation insofar as it applies to the defendant 
(who was Florence A. Powell) shall fail (R.158 insert 
added). 
After the lower court's determination that Florence 
Eunice Powell of Laurel Montana was indeed the "Florence 
Powell" under the decedent's will, the respondent was faced 
with the tough choice of how much Florence Powell's share 
was to be. Since it appears that the administrator could 
not contest the validity of the will as cited above, and the 
court had ruled that the estate was to pass by intestacy as 
to all of the parties except "Florence Eunice Powell" of 
Laurel Montana, the respondent's only recourse was to seek 
court approval of any distribution of the estate. 
POINT II 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IS THE PROPER METHOD TO RESOLVE 
CONFLICTING ORDERS OF THE COURT WHERE THE APPEAL PERIOD HAS 
PASSED. 
Section 75-3-1001 U.C.A. provides for a method to approve 
a distribution scheme proposed by a personal representative. 
Said section is akin to Rule 57 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and §78-33-1 u.c.A. et. seq. In fact, §78-33-2 
and §78-33-4 U.C.A. have expressed statutory language pro-
viding for the constuction of wills and the legal rights 
between parties arising therefrom. Finally, that chapter 
provides the following guideline in determining the scope of 
matters that may properly be brought before the court: 
_..,_ 
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"This chapter is declared to be remedial; its 
purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty 
and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal 
relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered." 
§78-33-12 U.C.A. See also: Citizen's Committee v. Marston, 
109 Ariz 188, 507 P.2d 113 (1973); Toncray v. Dolan, 593 P.2d 
956 (Colo 1979); and State v. Lanton, 523 P.2d 1064 (Okl 1974). 
In light of the remedial nature of the statute and the 
conflicting orders of the court, it was only proper for the 
respondent administrator to seek the assistance of the court 
by bringing the petition for declaratory relief. 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANT'S ATTACK ON THE LOWER COURT'S FINDINGS 
OF FACT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD ON APPEAL. 
The appellant spends considerable time in her brief 
discussing the issues of her testimony at the time of trial 
on the respondent's motion for declaratory judgment. None 
of these allegations, however, are properly before this 
court since the appellant has failed to designate a tran-
script of that testimony she is trying to further. 
On appeal it is the duty of the Supreme Court to sustain 
rulings made if it can be done, even though it may be upon 
matters not even urged on appeal. Peterson v. Fowler 29 Ut.2d 
266 570 P.2d 523 (1973). See also Sears v. Ogden City, 533 
P.2d 118 (1975). Though this court will not reverse a lower 
court's decision on errors claimed for the first time on 
appeal, this court has stated that it will affirm a lower 
court's judgment if sustainable on any legal ground or theory 
apparent in the record. Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 
23 Ut.2d 222, 461 P.2d 290 (1969). 
-8-
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The respondent contends, however, that the appellant has 
failed to raise any persuasive arguments on appeal which 
attack the lower court's decision. Instead, she has referred 
to numerous facts which are not a part of the record on 
appeal, and are in some instances being raised for the first 
time on appeal. 
The issues of her lack of understanding of the stipu-
lation entered in Civil Number 7416, her purported ownership 
of two certificates of deposit totaling $70,000, her pur-
ported ownership of the boat and motor-home, and her pur-
ported ownership of the $20,000 "trust fund" were all raised 
by her pleadings and were heard at the time of the trial. It 
is from the court's findings regarding those issues that she 
is appealing; yet, she offers no evidence other than her 
allegations to refute the court's findings. The Supreme 
Court has no alternative but to sustain the trial court's 
determination on those issues since it does not have any 
evidence before it to contradict the court's findings. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT THE PRIOR 
CIVIL CASE WAS RES JUDICATA AS AGAINST THE APPELLANT. 
A judgment based on a stipulation is res judicata as 
to the issues submitted to the court. In Re Evans, 42 Ut. 
282, 130 P. 217 (1913); Matthews v. Matthews, 102 Ut. 428, 
132 P.2d 111 (1942); and McCarthy v. State, Ut.2d 205, 
265 P.2d 387 (1953). 
For questions which are material to the merits of the 
case which are considered in a former opinion, the court's 
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judgment is binding as to such questions. In such cases, a 
determination of the merits or a stipulation uncontested 
after entry, is conclusive upon the parties in a subsequent 
action under the same or a different cause of action. See 
generally 49 A.L.R. 2d 1031, section 8. 
Furthermore, a party is bound by his judicial declara-
tion and may not contradict them in subsequent actions or 
proceedings. This is true of witnesses in prior and sub-
sequent litigation involving even different parties. Strum v. 
Boker, 150 U.S. 312, and Loomis v. Church, 76 Ida. 87, 277 
P.2d 56 (1954). In the absence of inadvertance or misappre-
hensive as to law, one who takes a position in one case as 
to the facts will be estopped to deny or alter such position 
or statement in a subsequent action although the parties may 
not be the same. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., v. Openshaw Invest-
ment Co., 102 Ut. 509, 132 P.2d 388 (1943). See also Hatton 
Realty Co. v. Baylus, 42 Wyo. 69, 190 P.561 (1930). 
In this case on appeal, the appellant would have the 
Supreme Court remove the res judicata effect of her prior 
stipulation and the court's prior independent findings. In 
fact, she is seeking to have "the entire probate proceeding 
remanded with instructions to have the entire probate retried 
and all of the matters pertaining to this estate reheard." 
The reason for the doctrine of res adjudicata is to bar 
the assertion of just this type of claim. The appellant had 
her day in court in the civil case in Uintah County. She failed 
to exercise her appeal rights from that decision. She is in 
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fact stipulated in open court to the very order she is now 
attacking. The trial court was correct in holding that the 
prior order was res judicata to the appellant's claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Even though the respondent, Central Bank and Trust 
Company as administrator of the estate of George R. Powell, 
deceased, is a mere stakeholder, it has the statutory duty 
to determine how the assets of the estate are to be dis-
tributed. When faced with conflicting court orders, it is 
proper for the administrator to seek court assistance in 
the form of declaratory judgment in determining how such dis-
tributions are to be made. The appellant's attack on the 
lower court's findings can not be maintained on appeal since 
she has offered no evidence whatsoever to contradict those 
findings. Finally, the trial court correctly applied the 
doctrine of res judicata to the appellant's attempt to 
avoid the prior court's orders, including her own stipu-
lat ion. 
The respondent respectfully requests this court to 
affirm the lower court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment. 
DATED at Provo, Utah, this ~day of June, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L.VALE~~ 
RD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
orneys for Respondent-
Administra tor 
120 East 300 North, 
Provo, Utah 84601 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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